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Economic Approaches to Nonrenewable
Resource Taxation
KEITH J. BREWER*
STEPHEN E. HAMILTON*
AND RICHARD A. WESTIN'**

The purpose of this Article is to provide the reader with a survey of
the current status of natural resource economics insofar as it relates to tax
policy. The topic is limited to oil, gas and minerals.
The Article begins with a review of the kinds of oil and gas
exploitation contracts that arose in the U.S. in a free-wheeling industry,
the primary feature of which is that private owners of the oil and gas
interests are able to enforce the property interests created by those
contracts. The subject is important because (1) those contracts spread
into the mining (and to a lesser extent the timber) industry, and (2) the
contracts are closely analogous to later tax systems in which the state
owns the resources.
There is a tendency among thinkers in the area to overlook these
market-based arrangements and to imagine that they are logically
separate from tax systems. They are not separate. Moreover, by
understanding the private forms, one is well-armed to evaluate the
taxation of natural resources and to detect the limits, especially the
inflexibility, of government-designed systems. One can then ask
questions about the wisdom of any particular country's choices in the
field of natural resource taxation. The Article then moves to the
economist's stand on the subject, as expressed in the prevailing
literature. Finally, the Article closes with some policy considerations
with respect to structuring tax systems in which the state is the proprietor
of the resources.
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I. OVERVIEW

It is perfectly possible to describe, in economic terms, an efficient
theoretical model for allocating risks and incentives to find and extract
exhaustible natural resources, without ever mentioning the concept of
taxation. In reality, however, the existence of an accompanying legal
superstructure of accessible courts, private remedies, and open markets
for information to ensure and enforce the allocation of rights and risks
agreed to by the parties is paramount. Otherwise, translation of any
efficient theoretical model to practice would be an impossibility.
The modem state is fueled by the need for stable revenue sources,
and the administration and regulation of such economic rights becomes
a necessity. The character and source of these revenues is of particular
concern to economists, and is the central theme of this Article.
"In contrast to taxation of most goods, the taxation of nonrenewable
resources tends to induce complex intertemporal avoidance behavior" on
the part of producers.' The central dilemma is that although a tax on
economic rent is conceptually neutral, taxation of nonrenewable
resources inevitably causes a response by the taxpayer. Such behavior
must be of interest to state authorities seeking to optimize revenue from
the extraction of exhaustible resources. Economists have proceeded on
the basis of increasingly sophisticated models of resource extraction, but
the differences in parameters among the models have led to varying
conclusions for purposes of setting fiscal policy. Even so, a review of
this economic literature demonstrates broad agreement as to the basic
economic behavior induced by each of the common forms of
nonrenewable resource taxation.
In order to facilitate that review, this Article examines the array of
possible legal mineral interests developed by the private sector to assign
risks and rewards in a free-wheeling minerals extraction industry in
which private persons can own mineral interests. To aid the reader's
understanding, key economic terms will then be defined, and the
underlying assumptions or variations of major models will be briefly
noted. Then, the economic implications of particular tax models are
summarized, and to the extent economists have differed or added
significant considerations to the debate, the differences are noted.

' Villamor Gamponia & Robert Mendelsohn, The Taxation of Exhaustible Resources, Q.J.
ECON. 165 (Feb. 1985).
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II. M INERAL INTERESTS AS RISKS AND REWARDS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Most nations currently considering taxation of natural resources are
not engaged in the task of creating and regulating new forms of property
rights ownership; almost everywhere, the nature of property interests
involved in the process of minerals extraction is well developed. In the
United States, there is a long tradition of private ownership of subsurface
mineral rights; nearly everywhere else, the developer now deals with the
state or its designee as the sole owner of rights to subsurface resources.
Because hydrocarbon and mineral extraction industries came to maturity
early on in North America, a vocabulary of familiar terms is now used
worldwide in natural resource production. Individuals use this
vocabulary to describe the degrees of contractual risk and
responsibilities undertaken by the operator and the residual rights holder.
National legislatures elsewhere in the world have also adopted it to
describe natural resource taxes. Even states that have no tradition of
private ownership of minerals in place often use this vocabulary, with the
healthy result that in any working exploration and development
agreement between a private investor-developer and a state, or virtually
any risk and profit-sharing arrangement arrived at between the parties,
can be expressly characterized and understood. Any system of tax
burdens and incentives imposed on the development project may be
imposed either by contract or upon the developer in its capacity as a
taxpayer under domestic tax law, or some combination of the two.
Under the U.S. system of mineral exploration and production,
assignments of risk and anticipated profit are generally effected through
the mechanism of the mineral lease, 2 an extremely flexible legal
instrument, invariably drafted by the landowner' and operator with an
eye to sharing in the most powerful tax incentive for present mineral
production--the U.S. system of mineral depletion allowances. The goals
of the private landowner entering into a lease are to maximize revenue
(which generally also means maximizing exploration and production)
4
under the lease, while minimizing damage and waste to the land itself.
Unless the owner-lessor is wealthy enough to explore and market
directly, or to hire driller-operators outright,- it must rely on the operator-

2

See generally RICHARD A. WESTIN & FRED F. MURRAY, TAXATION OF NATURAL

RESOURCES: OIL, GAS, MINERALS AND TIMBER 1-7 (1987).

' Or transferee or subtransferee of the mineral rights.
Uisdean R. Vass, A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development
Duringthe Reagan and ThatcherAdministrations(Pt. 1), 21 TULSA LJ. 23, 28 (1985).
' Id. at 27.
4
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lessee to bear all costs of exploration, extraction and marketing, and
retains only a non-operating interest as a less risky asset.6 Beyond the
acquisition and development costs the operator-lessee assumes, such a
producer is faced with other strategic concerns-allocation of scarce
capital over multiple possible extraction sites, observation of sound
extraction processes to avoid damage to the source of supply (including
environmental liabilities), and (in the case of integrated producers) the
quest for new sources of supply elsewhere to satisfy its open-ended
inventory needs.'
In American law the mineral lease serves as both a conveyance of a
form of real property interest and as a contractual arrangement between
the parties,' and endures as long as there is "production in paying
quantities."9 U.S. federal tax treatment regards the two essential interests
created by execution of the lease to be: (1) the working interest, which
is the lessee's interest in mineral property that is burdened with the cost
of development and operation of extraction;'0 and, (2) the reserved
nonoperating interest, unburdened by development cost of the ownerlessor. The owner-lessor typically receives: payment of a bonus in
return for his conveyance; delay rentals in return for the lessee's
privilege of deferring exploration; and royalties once mineral production
commences." All other interests or payments connected with execution
of a lease, whether "royalty interests, overriding royalties, net-profit
interests, undivided interests," production payment obligations, or others,
stem from the creation of these two interests and are briefly described
below.
Royalty. The usual meaning of a royalty is a payment made to the
landowner for extraction of a natural resource, based on output by value
or on occasion at a fixed price per unit of output. 2 In states where the
taxing authority is the natural resource owner, the economic benefit
accrues invariably to the same entity, regardless of whether the royalty

6

WEsTIN & MuRRAY,supra note 2, at 12. Of course, the landowner who grants a mineral

lease remains subject to the inherent risk that unproductive assays or test wells on the leased tract
may devalue the future lease value of his surrounding holdings.
' Charles 0. Galvin, The "Ought" and "is" of Oil-And-Gas Taxation, 73 HARv. L. REv.
1441, 1447-49 (1960).
IId. at 1485.
9 Id. at 1486.
'0 Ava C. Cornwell, Treatment of Oil andGas Working Interests Under the New Section 469
Temporary Regulations, 37 OIL & GAS TAx Q. 478, 480 (1988).
" Galvin, supra note 7, at 1482.
12

See RICHARD A. WEsTIN, SHEPARD's TAx DICIONARY 550-51 (1993-94) (providing

definition of royalty and other relevant tax terms).
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is imposed as a fee or a tax. Under U.S. common law a royalty may be
created by grant or reservation under a mineral lease, 3 and commonly in
the southwestern United States consists of one-eighth share of gross
production. 4 Many standard leases provide for guaranteed payment of
a minimum royalty regardless of production, which can be avoided by
the lessee or sublessee by surrendering the lease.' 5 A grantor-lessor may
be entitled to other payments from the lessee in respect of long-term
expectations of future production from leased land. Such payments are
delay rentals if made in respect of mineral sites not yet subject to
production, and shut-in royalties if associated with producing mineral
land subsequently removed from production.
Bonus. Bonuses are payments to the owner for entering into the
contract, payable without regard to production, and are generally
perceived as a substitute for a larger stream of royalties. It assures the
owner of income, and tests the confidence of the operator.
A bonus is rarely stated as a tax, although governments frequently
insist on various bonuses along the path from exploration to
development. For both the landowner and the government the reward is
the chance to recover the opportunity cost associated with tying up the
property. In some cases, the developer-as in the diamond industrynever plans to develop the property, and instead it relies on bonuses and
lease payments to keep excess production off the market.
Overriding Royalty. In the southwestern United States this is
typically a reservation of one-sixteenth of the leaseholder's seven-eighths
interest in gross production, with an accompanying assignment of the
working interest by sublease where both the overriding royalty and
sublease are limited to the term of the underlying lease.16
When stated as a tax, a royalty serves the same purpose as for the
landowner; it assures the government that it will receive revenues even
if the taxpayer is unable to make a profit.
Net Profits Interest. This is a reservation or grant measured by a
fraction of net profits rather than gross production. Its exact terms
depend on the contract, but it is typically payable when the project
produces a net cash surplus."
Net profit interests become income taxes when exacted by a
legislature. The base of such a tax, whatever its exact details, is gross

'3 WESTIN & MURRAY, supra note 2, at 13.
"A Vass, supra note 4, at 28.

15 WESTIN & MURRAY, supra note 2, at 22-3.
IA

Galvin, supra note 7, at 1441, 1478 n.108.

SId at 1478 n.109.
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income minus appropriate expenses. Governments are as free as
individuals to structure their details. Governments often enact a special
natural resource-related tax law. Failing that, they modify their basic
income tax rules to account for the peculiarities of the natural resources
industry. The United States, for example, chose the latter path."8
Production Payment. This subordinate lease interest entitles the
holder to a predetermined quantity of mineral production, or a fixed sum
of money realizable out of production, over some term under the lease.' 9
Both net profits interests and production payments may be conveyed
either in return for direct investment, or to obtain the services of the
driller, geologist, attorney, accountant and others,2' all of whom thereby
share in the ultimate success or failure of the project with no other
liability on their part.' Production payments are often used as bases for
lending money to the operator or landowner with respect to the natural
resource project. Russia, for example, has reportedly pledged a large
measure of its oil and gas wealth by means of loans collateralized by
forms of production payments.
Production payments may arise in concessions, but they are not part
of the natural resource tax systems. This is not surprising, because they
are generally used as financing arrangements.
A. Definitions
Various economic and taxation terms discussed in nonrenewable
resource literature may present initial confusion for the lay reader. To
assist the reader, these can be summarized briefly.
Economic Rent. At this stage it may be worthwhile to elaborate on
the meaning of "economic rent" and its applicability to real world
situations. At its simplest, the concept of economic rent just means the
ex post surplus or benefit that accrues to the owner from an activity, over
and above what would be required by the owner to be induced to engage
in the activity in the first place (i.e., ex ante).22 It is one short step then
to try to measure economic rent as the difference between the actual
price received and the price which would be required to induce the
IS

wEsTIN & MURRAY, supra note 2, at 9-10.

'9

Galvin, supranote 7 at 1478 n.111.

at 1489.
20d
21 For the majority of such interest-holders, tax on any gain realized from the venture has been

mitigated by application of the sophisticated U.S. depletion allowance rules, which have usually
subjected nonoperating economic interests in mineral extraction to percentage depletion allowance.
See WESTIN & MURRAY, supra note 2, at 113-52.
2

ALBERT M. CHURc ,TAxAnoN oF NONRENEwABLE REsouRcEs 64 (1981).
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owner to engage in the activity. The minimum price acceptable to the
owner to induce him to engage in the activity would, of course, have to
incorporate opportunity cost and, therefore, normal rates of profit on the
activity (including payments for all factors of production, especially
capital).
It is in the translation of this concept into practice, and in the
examination of decision-making, both ex ante and ex post, that
difficulties arise. These are difficulties of measurement, and also
difficulties of getting agreement between the opposing parties on the
measure. That is why any taxing authority that might have a view about
economic rent as being "the maximum that can be taxed away" must not
only have a view about the expected (i.e., ex ante) progression of the
economic parameters of price and cost over time, but must also guess
correctly as to what will be the outcome and, therefore, the resulting
ability of companies to pay taxes. In what follows, the reader should be
aware that these questions of "how time is handled" are complications
on top of the simplified, and more or less steady-state framework within
which such concepts of this Article are introduced.
A consistently positive economic rent is known as a "pure profit." 23
Since they are defined after all costs, pure profits are generally
considered irrelevant to economic decision-making. 24 And since such
post-decision taxes "impose no penalty on potential output" 25 they are
generally viewed as a justifiable base for taxation 26 and a source of
fascination for microeconomists and government tax planners.
Theoretically, all positive economic rent or "pure profit" is allocable by
the central taxing authority, once the producer's total costs (including
that share of costs classifiable as sufficient producer's profits) are
subtracted.' Economists therefore emphasize that non-distortional taxes
should utilize pure profits as their tax base.' Economic rent can accrue
to the owner in a free-wheeling situation, and to the state as the modem
owner of the resource.
User Cost. A related term is user cost, also termed resource rent or
scarcity profit, which has been called the opportunity cost of producing

Id. at 62.
CHRIS ROWLAND & DANNY HANN, THE ECONOMICS OF NORTH SEA OIL TAXATIoN 5
(1987).
2 MALCOLM GILLIS ET AL., TAX AND INvEsTMENT POICIES FOR HARD MINERALS: PUBLIC
AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN INDONESIA 153 (1980).
2
ROWLAND & HANN, supra note 25, at 4.
27 MERRE

G. KLAPP, THE SOVEREIGN

ENTREPRENEUR. OIL POLICIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS

DEVELOPED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 69 (1987).

2s

ROWLAND & HANN, supra note 25, at 54.
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from an exhaustible resource in the present, rather than deferring
production to the most favorable future period,29 at which time, if
discovery and development costs continue to increase, the present value
of a unit of proven reserve will be higher.30 Another authority calls user
cost "the amount that a fully informed, knowledgeable buyer would pay
for the ownership rights to a resource in situ."'" For the major OPEC oil
producers, for example, with their large proven reserves and extensive
undeveloped fields, user cost may be negligible, or even negative.32
Taken together, the per-unit cost of extraction, plus user cost, determine
market price.33 Where technology and demand are constant, "user cost
is positive and increases at the prevailing rate of interest," leading to
increasing rates of market prices.' 4
Grading. The phenomenon of resource grading becomes significant
when the student of resource economics abandons the assumption that
individual resource deposits are of uniform quality and readily
distinguished from their surroundings.35 In the real world most known
resource deposits are of varying quality. If the relative quality of the
respective deposits are assayed and compared upon discovery, then
assuming per-unit ore extraction costs are the same for all deposits and
product prices remain constant over time,36 economists commonly
assume producers will "grade select," that is, maximize revenue by
extracting resource deposits in diminishing order of their quality.37
Eventually a production source will be reached which becomes
to mine, and is left in place; this is known as the
prohibitively expensive
"cutoff grade. '31 Unless per-unit ore extraction costs change thereafter,
product grades lower than the cutoff grade will not be extracted, a
phenomenon known as "high-grading." High grading can only be
studied in the context of models that permit variations in the total amount
extracted, either through modeling that involves exploration for new

' Robert D. Cairns, A Model of Exhaustible Resource Exploitation With Ricardian Rent, 13
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 313, 313 (1986).
3o M.A. Adelman et al., User Cost in Oil Production, 13 RESOURCES & ENERGY 217, 223

(1991).
3' CHURCH, supra note 23, at 37.
32 Adelman et al., supranote 31, at 235.
33 CHURCH, supra note 23, at 40.
3 Id. at 65.
31 Cairns, supranote 30, at 314.
3
GILls, supranote 26, at 64.
37 Economic equations supporting this intuitively logical position are set out in PARTHA S.
DASGUPTA & GEOFFREY M. HEAL, ECONOMC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES 172-74

(1979).
38

Cairns, supranote 30, at 314.
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reserves or permits extracted cost to vary in relation to the size of the
remaining reserve.39
Tilting. Tilting refers to a reallocation of resource production, either
forward or backward along a derived resource extraction time path.4'
Less extraction of an exhaustible resource in earlier time periods, offset
by greater extraction in later periods, is termed "backward tilting," while
greater extraction in earlier times, resulting in lower production later on,
is "forward tilting." Such skewing of the production path need not
necessarily result in changes in cumulative extraction or changes in total
production.4 The significance of tilting as a potential source of
economic distortion lies in the risk that, through the imposition of a
particular tax, extraction will be propelled toward periods where the
present value of taxes is lower, depriving the taxing authority of part of
its anticipated revenue from taxation.4 2
Tax Shifting and Exporting. Tax shifting refers to the response of
a resource producer upon whom a tax is imposed, in reallocating
resources so that some portion of the ultimate burden of the tax is borne
by others, usually through changes in price of affected commodities.43
Any incidence of shifting implies that the initial tax burden is not falling
on true economic rent as defined above.' In the process of shifting,
inefficient allocation of resources can occur, leading to a return in
revenue to the taxing authority which is less than the aggregate burden
of the tax itself.45 An implicit assumption of ordinary tax shifting is that
the cumulative effects of tax are confined to the economic unit where the
tax arises. Tax exporting occurs whenever some portion of the burden
of a tax can be shifted beyond the borders of the taxing authority.' In
the context of nonrenewable resources, tax exporting may occur

39 ROBERTT. DEACON, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (ENERGY & NATURAL RESoURCES DIv.),
TAXATION, DEPLETION, AND WELFARE: A SIMULATION STUDY OF THE U.S. PETROLEUM RESOURCE

21(1990).
40 1& at 1.
41 Margaret E. Slade, Tax Policy and the Supply of Exhaustible Resources: Theory and
Practice, 60 LAND ECON. 133, 139 (1984).
42 Jeffrey A. Krautkraemer, Taxation, Ore Quality Selection, and the Depletion of a
Heterogeneous Deposit of a Nonrenewable Resource, 18 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 120, 133
(1990).
4 CHURCH, supra note 23, at 56-7 (providing an explanation of tax-shifting in the context of
an elementary supply-demand situation).
44 Mandy J. Wahby, Petroleum Taxation and Efficiency: The CanadianSystem in Question,
9J.ENERGY&DEV. 111, 112 (1984).
45 CHURCH, supra note 23, at 94-5.
46 Id. at 109.
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whenever the taxing authority dominates the resource market,47 and may
take either the form of an implied tax on the capital of nonresident
investors, or, whenever the nonrenewable resource is exported, an
implied tax on the nonresident consumers of products made from the
resource." The relative elasticities of the supply of capital and of
consumer demand for the resource will determine upon which of these
objects the incidence of such an implied tax falls. 9
Ring Fencing. Ring fencing is not at all an economic effect. Rather
it is a tax device used by resource-taxing states to avoid risk sharing on
unprofitable operations by refusing to allow an enterprise to set off
expenses or losses from such projects against profitable projects, in
periods where the enterprise is engaged in a variety of operations.5 ° For
example, in calculating corporate taxes for North Sea oil producers,
and production
Britain has employed a "ring fence around oil exploration
's
Shelf."'
Continental
its
and
U.K.
activities in the
B. Central Assumptions
Certain explicit and implicit assumptions underlie the economic
analyses surveyed here. The first is that the supply of the resource is
finite and exhaustible through extraction under competitive incentives
for production. 52 For most purposes, a steady-state technology,
composed of a menu of known industrial techniques, is also assumed.
That assumption is based on the fact that a firm may, in theory,
compensate or offset all or part of the incidence of an output tax by
adopting a technology with a lower per-unit production cost, the capital
acquisition and start-up costs of which are not negligible. In addition,
such offsets only provide per-unit savings over the long term, absent tax
or other incentives for such adoption. A third assumption is that an
international market for the resource exists at all times, so that there is a
free market world price for the resource. A fourth, related assumption
is that no major effects on the international market will be created by the
act of bringing the anticipated resource output online, and that all of the
resource output that can be produced can be sold at current market
47

id

48

id

49 ROWLAND & HANN, supra note 25, at 55.
o Kaneel I. F. Khan, Petroleum Taxation and Contractsin the Third World-A Law and
Policy Perspective, 22 J. WORLD TRADE, 67, 76-7 n.24 (1988).
5' ALEXANDER G. KEMP & DAVID ROSE, INVESTMENT IN OIL EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 7 (1982).
32 DEACON, supra note 40, at 20.
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prices.
III. VARIABLES AMONG ECONOMIC MODELS
Economic research on taxation of nonrenewable resources has its
genesis in the field of ore mining and processing. Nevertheless, those
commentators who have focused specifically on hydrocarbon extraction
have proceeded on essentially identical assumptions, and reached
comparable conclusions regarding the effects of taxation on production
decisions. However, certain recent writers have addressed important
variables of resource development models, and to the extent that their
works have introduced new factors or challenged underlying
assumptions, their efforts need to be briefly noted here.
A principal economic variable is the difference between a
monopolistic and a competitive resource extraction model.
A
competitive market for exploration and exploitation rights bears directly
on the level of economic rent the state may allocate to itself in tax
revenues. Since, as noted previously, economic rent equals total
resource revenue less total costs, including a producer's profit,53 "the
greater the competition among private companies for access to resource
sites, the smaller will be the profit share they are willing to accept in
order to gain access"54 and the greater total portion of economic rent
accruing to government revenue. Viewed purely in the exploration
mode, such competition for licenses may have a down side. British
authors suggest that intense competition for exploratory licenses and the
successively higher bids required to obtain licenses may displace other
opportunities of commensurate value or increase the company's
borrowing costs, thereby lowering anticipated profits and inhibiting
further exploration.55
On the other hand, a monopolistic producer with complete control
over resource production, and therefore the ability to affect prices, will
maximize profits by extracting the resource more slowly than if the
industry were organized competitively, and therefore behave in a manner
that is overly conservative of the resource.5 6 In his research, Yuicel
confirms that "the rate of extraction and the overall level of exploration
are lower and prices are higher with a monopolistic producer," and "the
amount of reserves left in the ground at the end of the time horizon is

5

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

5

KLAPP, supra note 28, at 69.
ROWLAND & HANN, supra note 25, at 14.

56 CHURCH, supra note 23, at 43-4.
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generally higher for monopoly. 57
Central to conclusions regarding resource grading and the cut-off
grade determination are the assumptions made regarding the resourcecomposition alternatives available for immediate extraction by producers.
Successive studies have considered a homogeneous deposit or deposits,"
multiple deposits--each of which are intrinsically homogeneous but of
varying quality when compared among themselves,59 and resource
deposits of varying intrinsic quality.' Although the quality variable is,
in the context of grade selection, usually confined to discussions of
resources which are mined, hydrocarbon deposits which may or may not
require additional processing due to the presence or absence of
associated contaminants such as paraffin, sulfur and sour gases, are
probably true analogs to the heterogeneous ore deposit. While the effects
of particular taxes on various deposit models are provided in the next
section, the principal difference in determining grade between deposits
known to be internally homogeneous and those known in advance to be
heterogeneous is that, if the nature of deposits is known, the grade choice
in the first case can be more carefully considered, resulting in less
wasteful extraction than is the case with heterogenous deposits, where
the grading decision must be constantly reassessed and redetermined. 6'
While many economists addressing nonrenewable resources assume
that extracted resources are sold directly (and any output or other taxes
imposed upon such unprocessed resource sales), others have assumed
taxation at an intervening stage of refining or processing prior to the
commodity leaving the producer's hands.62 Such a modified assumption
is both logical (since states may and do impose taxes at varying stages of
resource production) and relevant, since taxes imposed at early stages of
production are invariably passed on to later buyers. Moreover, the

"7 Mine K. Yiicel, Severance Taxes and Market Structure in an Exhaustible Resource
Industry, 16 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGMT. 134, 139 (1989).
58 H. Stewart Burness, On the Taxation of NonreplenishableNatural Resources, 3 J. Envil.
Econ. & Mgmt. 289, 290-91 (1976).
" Robert F. Conrad & Bryce Hool, Resource Taxation with Heterogeneous Quality and
Endogenous Reserves, 16 1. PuB. ECON. 17 (1981) [hereinafter Resource Taxation].
' Krautkraemer, supranote 43, at 133.
61 Id at 120-25, 133-34. See also Burness, supra note 59, at 290-94; Resource Taxation,
supranote 60, at 19-22. Cf. DOUGLAS R. Born & MIcHAEL A. TOMAN, ANALYZiNG NONRENEWABLE REsouRcE SUPPLY 43-49 (1984) (providing a theoretical model for development of "joint
products" found together, such as gold and silver, in the belief that an assumption of homogenous
product is often wrong).
62 See, e.g., GtLls, supra note 26, at 110 ("Relatively little attention has been given in the
economic literature to the harmful effects that output-based taxes may have on concentration
decisions and other minerals-processing decisions.").
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resource producer which is vertically integrated entirely within the taxing
authority's jurisdiction will experience the amplified distortions of a tax
imposed on initial (raw) output, or on multiple stages of production,
unless the cumulative tax burden can be ultimately exported.63
Classic economic models, as noted previously, assume both fixed,
and therefore fully exhaustible mineral reserves and an extraction cost
which does not vary with cumulative past output or remaining reserves.'
Such assumptions have significance for related assumptions regarding
competitive price trends over time, generally conceived as moving
gradually upward.' But some recent writers part with these assumptions
in models of oil and gas supply, noting that as a practical matter the
assumption of incomplete physical exhaustion seems more appropriate.
Resource deposits such as oil are not completely exhausted but are
abandoned long before this point because they become uneconomical to
extract.' From his study of classical full exhaustion models, Adelman
concludes that "given the fixed-stock assumption, the value of a unit inground should equal the spot price net of extraction cost."'67 This
theoretical equality is not borne out in then-current world market prices,
under which oil in the ground is worth roughly one-half of its net
wellhead price, and coal reserves are usually less than one percent of the
world spot price.68 What we observe in the real world, says Adelman,
"are not one time stocks immaculately created to be consumed, but
inventories of 'proved reserves,' constantly renewed by investment in
finding and development. Over time, the investment needed per unitadded is forced up by diminishing returns, and forced down by
increasing knowledge." 69
Bohi and Toman therefore conclude that the economist Hotelling's
"r percent rule," i.e., that rates of return per physical unit of the resource
are equal to the discount rate "has limited practical applicability, despite
its widespread use. To fully understand the dynamics of resource supply,
it is necessary to use more complex models that recognize both depletion
effects and additions to reserves through exploration and development."70

63 For a thorough discussion of these principles, see generally Slade, supra note 42.

See BoHI & TOMAN, supra note 62, at 23.
65 DASGUPTA & HEAL, supra note 38, at 179.

6
67
69
69
70

BoHI & TOMAN, supra note 62, at 13.
Adelman, supra note 31, at 222-23.
i
d at 218.

BOI & TOMAN, supra note 62, at 25.
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IV. SURVEY OF NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE TAx MODELS
7
Property Tax Model. Since Hotelling's premier study in 193 1,
there has been general agreement among economists that imposition of
a property tax on the value of a nonrenewable resource deposit in the
ground tends to accelerate resource extraction, 72 and this extraction will
also tend to be concentrated on the higher grades." Gamponia and
Mendelsohn note that the burden of the property tax primarily falls upon
the owner of the resource, so that "the shift of extraction from the future
to the present increases the present value of consumer surplus, even
though the total value of the resource falls." ' 4 The owners are
subsidizing consumers in the owners' effort to avoid paying taxes.
This rapid extraction of proven reserves of any taxed resource is
combined with a slowdown in drilling programs in the case of petroleum,
so as to diminish taxable reserves.76
Other writers have focused on the uncertain assumptions inherent in
capitalizing estimated reserves of a resource for tax purposes, a point
made by Burness, who observed that firms tend to report exploration
costs rather than the value of reserves which would be quite arbitrary
even if firms chose to report this figure. Church reports that virtually
all jurisdictions employing in-ground property taxes have ceased to rely
on capitalizing techniques.78

In order to determine annual net income for the life of the mine,
accurate forecasts of revenues and costs must be made. This
entails knowing future prices and the costs of extraction,
processing, and transporting the resource. Additionally, the rate
of extraction and economically exploitable reserves determine
mine life, and this must be estimated as well. Once the net
annual profit is calculated from these data, it must be

'
72

Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 75 (1931).
See, e.g., CHURCH, supra note 23, at 67-8 (providing a numerical example of the effects

of property taxes on the rate of extraction in the context of mining); DEACON, supra note 40, at 23;
Gamponia & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 165; Krautkraemer, supra note 43, at 129-30; see
generally Resource Taxation, supra note 60.
Resource Taxation, supra note 60, at 29.
7 Gamponia & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 177-78.
Id. at 165.
"
76 DEACoN, supra note 40, at 17.
' Burness, supra note 59, at 298 n.10.
7 CHURCH, supra note 23, at 79.
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capitalized.... ."
Since the information necessary to make such estimates is rarely
available, most jurisdictions instead employ a discounted cash flow
analysis.80
A few economists have considered the effects of a property tax on
exploration, and have typically found that such a tax discourages
exploration and related development, on the assumption that increased
identified reserves increases total potential tax liability, and thus
increases carrying costs over the life of the project."'
Franchiseor License Tax. The form of tax most closely related to
the in situ property tax is an annual franchise or license tax on the firm's
right to extract the resource, considered by Burness 2and by Heaps. 3
Since "the franchise tax is one that can be avoided by reducing the length
of time the [resource site] is in operation," imposition of the franchise tax
"causes increased rates of extraction and earlier resource depletion. '
Output Taxes. Generally speaking, severance taxes are of two types:
a flat per-unit tax on production, and a tax imposed ad valorem
calculated as a proportion of the value of annual production. The latter
form of severance tax is frequently termed a royalty.'
Per-unit severance taxes on production have received less attention
from economists than have royalties.8 6 Measurement of the effects of a
per-unit tax on output and grading depends on how the unit price and the
rate of unit tax vary with time. A common assumption of economists,
generally borne out in reality, is that given constant demand, unit prices
tend to increase over time. 7 To the extent that the unit tax rate remains
constant in such an environment (either through legislation or through
contractual agreement with producers) the magnitude of the effects of
such a tax on production and grade selection ought to diminish over
time. To the extent resource producers adhere to this assumption, there
9d.
s

d

s' See CHuRcH, supranote 23, at 75 (summarizing other writers' conclusions).
82 Burness, supra note 59, at 294-95.
83 Terry Heaps, The Taxation ofNonreplenishableNaturalResources Revisited, 12 . ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 14,21 (1985).
u Id.at 21; see also Burness, supra note 59, at 295.
85 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. These do appear never to have any analogy
in the free-wheeling oil and gas industry, probably because it is too rigid.
6 See Wahby, supra note 45, at 112; DEACON, supra note 40, at 12; Krautkraemer, supra note
43, at 128-29.
87 Or, more specifically in economic terms: "User cost grows at the rate of interest." CHRRCH,
supra note 23, at 41.
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exists an incentive to defer production of the resource to the future.
Nevertheless, many natural resource commodities have experienced
spectacular falls in short to medium-term unit prices on world markets
over the last two decades. Such a fall would have a strong adverse effect
on profits of any resource producer subject to a politically determined
constant tax on unit output. The difficulties for taxing authorities and
resource investors alike in gauging future movements in both world
resource prices and unit tax rates is appreciable. That is one of the
reasons for the attraction of taxes based on profits in some jurisdictions.
Ad valorem severance taxes more commonly provide a basis for
study and discussion. A severance tax, as noted, is a fixed proportion of
the value of current output calculated at the current market price.' Since
the per-unit market price for any period is variable, the per-unit value of
the severance tax also fluctuates. Economists generally agree that the
imposition of a severance tax tends to shift extraction into the future,
when the present value of the tax is less.89 This tendency is generally
regarded as conserving the known resource reserve. That assumption has
been qualified in a study by Yticel, who observes that a severance tax
decreases exploration, leading to lessened additions to new reserves. 9°
Because "additions to the initial resource stock from exploration are
less," the result is a "lower level of resources at the end of the time
horizon." 9'
An output-based tax is generally viewed as not
discriminating between the differing qualities of resource product being
extracted. Since a producer is assumed to have the ability to discriminate
in deciding whether to develop mines or fields of marginal quality, it will
forego those investments in production where extraction costs are higher,
or product quality lower, than the standard level assumed in imposing the
tax, causing loss of potential product revenue to the taxing entity.
CorporateIncome and Profits Taxes and Incentives. A corporate
income or profits tax on resource production, if constant over time, is
borne entirely by the firm. 92 "Since in the short run neither the price
received for the mineral nor the cost of obtaining it are affected by the
income tax, the mine operator has no reason to raise the cutoff grade or
to change the rate of production."9 3 Recent economists have concluded,

"' See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89 See DEACON, supra note 40, at 20-2; Resource Taxation, supranote 60, at 26-7; Gamponia
& Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 178-79; Krautkraemer, supra note 43, at 121.
90 YUcel, supranote 58, at 147.
91

Id.

9

Wahby, supra note 45, at 114-15. This is the government analog of a net profits interest.

93 GILLIS, supra note 26, at 66.
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virtually without exception, that such a tax will have no net effect on
market price, the rate of extraction, grade selection, or total output
recovery from an operating mine or field.94 By virtue of its neutrality
most regard such a tax as the least oppressive means of collecting
economic rent.95 Clearly greater attention might be paid in the economic
literature to the point in the production chronology at which an initial
income or profits tax should be imposed. Slade is exceptional in
separating the exploration and production models, and in pointing out
the role an existing profits tax may have in discouraging investment at
the time decisions whether to commence exploration activities are
made.96
Economists are also less than precise in defining the elements of the
taxable income upon which tax is to be imposed. Deacon provides a
good general guide, noting that to the degree provisions are included for
expensing capital outlays, the income tax will come to resemble a tax on
the cash flow of the industry, and thus be relatively distortion free in its
effect.'
Some analysts point to the differing effects an income or profits tax
produces when it is not constant, but is instead increasing. Rowland and
Hann assert that "it is not relevant to development decisions whether a
tax is progressive.., as long as the tax base is pure profits." 98 However,
if an income tax is raised, or the costs of production under a progressive
model income tax increase
to a level at which the costs of capital cannot be covered, then
equipment will not be replaced, and the mine may be shut down
sooner than had been planned before the tax increase. Thus in
the long run, income tax increases can also lead to high grading,
shortening the life of the mine and reducing its total mineral
output. 99
The effects of combining a depletion allowance with a system of

9
See, e.g., Burness, supra note 59, at 302; Resource Taxation, supra note 60, at 30; Robert
F. Conrad & R. Bryce Hool, IntertemporalExtraction of Mineral Resources Under Variable Rate
Taxes, 60 LAND ECON. 319, 324 (1984) [hereinafter Intertemporal Extraction]; Gamponia &
Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 167; Krautkraemer, supra note 43, at 121; Slade, supra note 42, at
142; Wahby, supra note 45, at 115-16.
9 Khan, supra note 5 1, at 74.
Slade, supra note 42, at 142-43.
'7

DEACON, supra note 40, at 22.

ROWLAND & HANN, supra note 25, at 46.
SGILLIs, supra note 26, at 66.

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

[VOL. 11: 175

profits taxation are frequently discussed. 1° A depletion allowance is a
tax incentive or subsidy to production often authorized as a deduction
from income in connection with profits tax schemes, and is not neutral
in its effects on output or grade selection. Depletion allowances may
take the form either of cost depletion (a fixed monetary allowance per
unit of output) or percentage depletion (a fixed proportion of the current
value of output). Under the well developed U.S. depletion incentive
system, as resource interests are used up, cost depletion causes a ratable
reduction in basis while percentage depletion permits deductions in
excess of basis.'0 ' The market-sensitive system of divided mineral
interests ensures each interest holder may claim a depletion deduction on
his own share.' °2 For example, a lease bonus paid to the lessor of a
working mineral interest, taxed as ordinary income when received, is
subject to cost depletion only, and reduces the bonus recipient's basis in
his retained interest. 3 The generally accepted economic tendencies of
depletion allowances are to reallocate resource extraction from the future
05
to the present," and decrease the extraction source's present value.'
Windfall or Excess Profits Tax. Certain taxes are intended to
capture levels of pure profit so far in excess of the rate of return required
for making the investment that they have no bearing on investment,
exploration or development decisions."06 These profits may, therefore,
be captured by the state in their entirety. Such extraordinary returns may
be due to unusually large or exceptionally high quality resource
discoveries, or may be caused by unprecedented and unanticipated rises
in the world price of the commodity-well above the prices in force at
the time the state's tax base was last determined, as in the case of certain
crude oil windfall profits taxes imposed in the 1980's. A windfall or
excess profits tax may, if set above the true level of extraction cost
including producer's profit, be truly nondistortionary and neutral in
capturing pure economic profit or revenue. In practice, the difficulty
falls in computing the profit level at which the tax commences for
industries in which producers do not typically provide information on
rates of return. " According to one authority, "if the gains (or losses) [of
mineral extraction] were even remotely anticipated, then they should be

'oo

102
103

Resource Taxation, supra note 60, at 30-31.
WESTIN
Wo'
& MURRAY, supra note 2, at 113, referring to U.S. practice.
Id at 14.
Id at 116.

,o' Resource Taxation, supra note 60, at 30 n.17.
'o
"0
'o

CHURcH, supra note 23, at 81.
Khan, supra note 51, at 78.
Id at 79.
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for bearing risks and hence must be
viewed as a reward (or penalty)
08
excluded from pure profits."'
V. THE OPTIMAL NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE PLAN
AS A NATIONAL OBJECrIVE

Even with this well-developed and growing body of economic
theory available to state tax planners, the place of the efficient economic
model of resource taxation in the hierarchy of national objectives a state
must consider is sometimes in doubt. Some of the economists who have
practical experience with state policies have noted a real dichotomy
between policy choices for initial exploration and for ongoing
exploitation, a difference rarely suggested in the theoretical literature."
One practical problem has been dealt with by Campbell and Lindner,
who note a major disfunction in models that propose taxation of
exploration and production as a continuum: while "mineral taxation will
be neutral if all costs can be deducted against taxable income... firms
which conduct exploration programmes which result in a decision not to
mine, or firms which decide to mine when realised net present value
turns out to be negative may have no taxable income against which
losses can be deducted."" 0
With particular regard to oil exploration, one study of a dozen state
systems of petroleum taxation concluded that "the majority of the fiscal
systems are structurally unhelpful to the needs of a risk-averse investor
contemplating the development of high cost fields.""' One reviewer has
identified ten distinct forms of risk that must be identified and evaluated
by the international minerals developer and its financiers: reservoir,
completion, technology or production, market, co-participant, cost
overrun, operator, political, foreign exchange and force majeure." 2 At
least two of these, political and foreign exchange risk, would appear to
have no direct analogs in U.S. domestic mineral production.
Even when the policy goal of the state is confined to raising
maximum revenue from taxing an exhaustible resource with a minimum
of economic distortion, the state is confronted with a host of
considerations beyond the purely economic concerns addressed thus far.

'0 ROWLAND & HANN, supra note 25, at 5.
9 H.F. Campbell & R.K. Lindner, A Model of Mineral Exploration and Resource Taxation,
95 EcoN. J. 146, 154 (1985).
10 Id. at 154.
. KEMP & RoSE, supranote 52, at 34.
..
2 Richard A. Ladbury, FinancingResource Projects,62 AUSTL. L.J. 937,937-43 (1988).
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In practice, these may be discussed according to the groupings set forth
by Sneed:"' adequacy, practicality, equity, reduced economic inequality,
free market compatibility, stability and maintenance of political order.
Church ranks common nonrenewable resource taxes upon criteria similar
to Sneed's." 4
In recent reports on the experiences of developing nations, accounts
of difficulties of administration (Sneed's "practicality") with otherwise
model taxes figure largely. As noted previously, while the property tax
is not difficult to administer, fervent discussions take place among
economists as to whether such a tax can ever be said to be administered
"correctly," because of the difficulties inherent in evaluating the
capitalized worth of the resource property remaining. Relatively few
sales of resource property at published prices take place for comparison,
and Church gives a summary of the criticisms usually made of the two
most widely used formulas for capitalizing present income streams to
yield property value." 5 In their report on Indonesia, Gillis and Beals
note a substantial "compliance problem" related to the corporation
income tax, which did not apparently extend to Indonesia's output-based
export tax." 6 Writing on petroleum taxation in Canada, Wahby also
notes that gross-output taxes, while "held in low esteem by economists,"
remain popular with state governments because the data needed to
calculate the tax are easily obtainable and costs of enforcement are
low." 7 Unlike income taxes, one need not deal with the accounting
principles behind depletion, costs, and depreciation deductions." 8 Worst
of all to administer are excess profits taxes. Gillis and Beals conclude
that "the more successful are such [excess profits] taxes in capturing
'windfalls,' without harmful side effects, the more complex-and, very
likely, difficult to administer-must be their structure. And the more
easily administered are excess profits taxes, the less is it likely they will
' 9
adequately capture rents.""
As to free market compatibility, Gillis and Beals succinctly note the
five potentially significant ways output-based taxes distort free market
production decisions, each of which has already been discussed here.
Such taxes may: "1) distort the initial investment decision by causing

'

Joseph J. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STANFORD L. REv. 567

(1965).
CHURCH, supra note 23, at 87-92.
Id. at 76-80.
116 GILLIS, supranote 26, at 87.
.. Wahby, supra note 45, at 114-15.
"

"5

"l

Id

"'

GILLIS, supranote 26, at 155.

1995-96]

NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE TAXATION

some projects not to be developed; 2) give rise to 'high grading' of
[resource deposits]; 3) shift extraction to the future; 4) cause
postponement of extraction of better grade [deposits]; or 5) reduce total
recovery from a given [deposit]."'' 0
As already noted, excess profits taxes earn high marks for being free
of market-distorting effects.' Because such taxes are triggered by a
specific rate of return on total investment and not on equity investment,
they do not distort weak and average operations. In addition, in cases of
highly profitable operations the state obtains an additional share, without
having to disturb underlying contractual arrangements.
As to stability, it is suggested that government and private producers
each view entirely different taxes as inherently more stabilizing to
revenue. Under a royalty arrangement, government revenues are more
stable, while "the company experiences less variation in its after tax
income" under an income tax regime. 122 The stability of return on
private capital under an income tax has particular significance for
exploration. This is true because, all other things being equal, investors
do not like risk, and as countries' use of income taxes increase
exploration activity increases. 2 1 On the other hand, the stability of
revenue to the taxing authorities attainable under royalty arrangements
is doubtless one reason such arrangements still exist.
VI. NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE TAX SCHEMES IN PRACTICE
Given the disparity in identified resources among various nations,
direct comparison of their systems for exhaustible resource taxation
would be futile. It would be almost as unrewarding to weigh individual
nations' tax schemes against the most approximate economists' model
for such tax; almost no country relies on a single revenue-producing levy
on any mineral, and the varieties of hybrid forms are legion. However,
clearly dysfunctional mineral development schemes are rich laboratories
for further study, and nations which have repeatedly altered their
resource tax systems in recent years provide a basis for internal
comparisons, particularly when such tax programs are charted against the
variations in revenue that accompanied them.
The United Kingdom's experience in taxing its North Sea oil
discoveries has been much discussed. Since 1976 Britain has relied on
-2 Id. at 160.
.2 See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
122 Id. at 60.
123 id.
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three separate levies, as amended from time to time: (1) a royalty levied
at the well-head, at rates tied to the timing of issuance of the particular
license for the oil's source; (2) a corporate profits tax (CT) calculated at
52%; and (3) the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) on profits, calculated
at 45%24 As noted above, Britain employs ring-fencing to prohibit
North Sea profits from being offset by North Sea losses. From the
standpoint of the entrepreneurial risk taker, the U.K. system of offshore
ring fencing "prevents tax losses and double tax relief derived elsewhere
being used against North Sea profits and restricts the capacity of the
companies to obtain relief for advance corporation tax."' 25 While PRT
is deducted from the corporate income on which CT is then levied,"2 CT
has been criticized by British economists as distortional because it is "a
tax on the excess of revenues over historic costs, and may affect
development decisions since historic costs are a poor reflection of normal
returns on capital."'' 27 One study calculated that the share of economic
rent taken by the government from offshore fields under this arrangement
varied from 22% on fields of very low profitability to almost 75% on
large, highly profitable fields.'2 8 That study revealed a considerable
disparity between incentives to present and newly entering producers.
For an ongoing, taxpaying investor, new field developments are not
inhibited, 29while the percentage of tax take in present value terms for
new investors can reach very high levels under adverse operating
conditions, exceeding 100% of economic rent in some cases, and
possibly inhibiting new field development. 30
From 1986 to 1992, Norway utilized a petroleum tax system
composed of: (1) a capital tax at 0.3%; (2) a general corporate
(municipal) tax of 23%; (3) a general (national) corporate tax of 27.8%;
(4) a special tax of 30%; and (5) a production royalty (deductible from
income tax) between 8 and 16%.' State participation, never less than
50% and often higher under Norwegian licensing procedures, can result

" TERENCE DAINTm & B. G. D. M. WILLOUGHBY, A MANJAL OF UNnED KINGDOM OIL AND
GAS LAW 91 (1977).
J. A. KAY & M. A. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 191 (3d ed. 1983).

Id. at 190.
ROWLAND & HANN, supra note 25, at 58.
'
A. Kemp, Development Risks and Petroleum Fiscal Systems: A Comparative Study of the
UK, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, 13 ENERGY J. 17,23 (1992).
29 ld. at 28.
'"

"0 Id. at 29.

"' Stig Sollund, Norway. 1992 Petroleum Tax Reform, 1992 EUR. TAX'N 222,222. (As part
of the reform discussed by Sollund, Norway has recently reduced the combined corporate tax
burden-items (2) and (3) above-from 50.8% to 28% for all corporations.)
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in total government takes of between 80% and 90%. However, such
participation is on a full risk sharing basis, which means that while it
provides some downside protection to investors the overall potential for
return on investment is reduced as well.'3 2
The Netherlands, a third North Sea oil producer, employs the
traditional three resource taxes: a royalty, a corporate tax (CT) and a
special petroleum tax based on profit share (SPS).'33 The Netherlands
essentially calculates royalties and SPS on a per-field basis, M and while
royalties are as usual deducted from profits in calculating the two profits
taxes, "the interdependence between CT and SPS takes a special form:
SPS is deductible from the base of CT while CT is creditable against
SPS.' 35 The royalty has been criticized as a regressive element whose
negative impact on development increases at high levels of development
cost. 36 Nevertheless, overall offshore development costs are low
compared to other North Sea producers, and total government take has
been estimated at between 60% and 70%.137
The author of the recent study on North Sea oil taxation from which
these tax rates estimates come concludes that in none of the countries is
there a fiscal system which is directly targeted at economic rents, but in
all except the Netherlands the schemes are now entirely profit-related-a
significant structural improvement from the regimes introduced in the
1970s. 131 Other countries have also attempted to introduce more profit
and field sensitive schemes.
Ghana relies on its Petroleum Income Tax Law, imposing a tax of
50% of "chargeable income" but allowing a different percentage or
alternatively another kind of tax "in lieu of income tax" to be negotiated
under a petroleum agreement between the state and the hydrocarbon
producer. 39 Even though such a negotiated tax would presumably be
lower than the statutory rate," ° the device has been criticized on grounds
of equity and certainty because of the sensitive nature of the industry and
its ramifications in both domestic and international politics.' 4 '

132
13

Kemp, supra note 129, at 28.
Dominique Thon, A Note on the Structure of the Dutch Petroleum Taxation System, 6 J.

ENERGY & NAT. REsouRcEs
134 Md at 163.

L. 162, 162 (1988).

135 Id. at 162.

" Kemp, supranote 129, at 37.
138 d at 37-8.
139

R. Bannerman, Ghana'sPetroleum Tax Law, INT'L FiN. L. REV. (January 1989) 35, 35.

1401&
141

Id at 36.
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Australia employs an additional profits tax on petroleum, known as
the Resource Rent Tax (RRT), which has been adopted by developing
countries.' 42 Introduced in 1984, the tax applies to new offshore fields
on a project basis, and replaces earlier excise and royalty tax schemes
where it applies.'43 The RRT is "payable only after the oil company has
recovered its cost and earned an agreed threshold rate of return.... The
tax is levied on the accumulated value, i.e., value of cash receipts less
total outlay, in the year it becomes positive."'" Because the risk-taking
entrepreneur is assured full capital recovery plus profit return, regardless
of price changes, field size, production and cost conditions the tax has
been touted as helping to maximize economic rent with a minimum of
distortion. 45
Papua New Guinea's current tax structure, developed with the
assistance of Australian economists, combines an RRT above a threshold
return to investment of 15% with the country's pre-existing ad valorem
royalty (1.25%), a Flat Profits Tax (33.3%), an Additional Profits Tax
(APT), and a Withholding Tax of 15% on dividends paid to foreign
shareholders, for a total tax rate of 70% on profits above the threshold
return.' 46 Under the Papua New Guinea system, "which combines low
rates of royalty and flat rate profits tax, a high rate of tax on 'abovenormal' profits and a provision for accelerated depreciation for marginal
mines," the national government has managed to capture a high
proportion of presumed pure profits from extraction "while ensuring
continued investment in exploration and in existing and new mines.""
Namibia, a still largely unexplored area for hydrocarbons, recently
adopted a petroleum tax scheme appropriately tailored for a state at the
outset of minerals development, composed of (1) a 12.5% legislated
royalty, negotiable for marginal fields;' (2) an income tax on 42% of
taxable income; and, (3) a three-tiered, partially negotiable additional
profits tax which is based on a company's rate of return calculated at
successive levels of 15, 20 and 25% with the APT on the 15% tier fixed

142

Khan, supra note 51, at 78.

Michael Hunt, Government Policy and Legislation Regarding Mineral and Petroleum
Resources, 62 AUSTL.L.J. 841, 862 (1988).
'" Khan, supra note 51, at 78.
'45 d at 79.
" Ciaran O'Faricheallaigh, Mineral Taxation in Less Developed Countries: Papua New
Guinea "sBalancedSystem, 45 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 291, 293 (1986).
47 Il at 294.
M.P. Light & H. Shimutwikeni, Namibia, Practically Unexplored, May Have Land,
Offshore Potential,OiL & GAS J. (April 8, 1991) 85, 86.
"4
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at 25% and subsequent tiers at negotiable rates. 149 No signature, levy,
production or bonus payments must be paid to the government, 50 and
Namibia's version of ring fencing for cost accounting "[o]perates on an
original exploration license area basis, not field by field, allowing
developers to recoup total expenditure at a faster rate."''
VII. SOURCES OF REAL WORLD DISTORTION FROM
ECONOMIC MODELS OF TAXATION
Shortfalls in Tax Administration. One principal distortion of
national tax policy discussed in recent years is the rise, for political
reasons, of state enterprises to run mineral operations, often with
privileged tax treatment and consequent revenue decreases.
Distorting Effects of Competing Tax Authorities. Federally
structured taxing authorities which compete in garnering mineral
resources and revenues face special problems. While in theory there
would seem no impediment to producing enterprises adjusting to
successive, incremental layers of taxing authority as elements of
producer cost (any more than there would be to successive levels of
differently imposed tax originating with a single authority), in practice
such tax planning has seldom proceeded so smoothly. A detailed
account of Canadian tax policy changes demonstrates that in the wake of
the 1973 world oil price rise, the Canadian Federal Government, faced
with an eroded tax base due to increases in provincial royalties, declared
provincial royalties nondeductible at the very time Alberta's provincial
government sought to capture a part of the petroleum industry's windfall
profits by boosting its royalty rate.' 52 The result was a threatened
slowdown in domestic oil production, which engendered further ad hoc
governmental responses at both taxing levels. 5 3 The need to fund
distinct levels of government authority separately, combined with a
continuing temptation to attempt to export provincial severance taxes,
may have made Canada's quest for maximum economic revenue from
petroleum more difficult. A recent study of severance taxes in the U.S.
Federal System summarized economic researchers' conclusions on the

"4

id.

150

Id

151 Id
52 Wahby, supra note 45, at 119. This applies to non-fuel minerals as well. For example,
British Columbia's provincial taxes were increasing but were deductible (before 1976) for federal
corporate income tax purposes, the result was an obvious detriment to Canadian federal revenues.
153 id.
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effects of energy tax exporting in such a system. Among these
conclusions are that: (1) in a federal system, "efficient taxation of
resources can be achieved only by federal taxation or extensive revenue
sharing among states."; 1 2) geographic variation in the presence of
resources induces state taxing authorities to pursue output-based tax
policies that lead to inefficient migration of labor and capital;..5 and (3)
from an efficient fiscal federalism standpoint, consumption taxes and
are less subject to exporting) are preferable to
income taxes (which
56
severance taxes.1
DistortionsDue to External Tax Policies. Firms engaged in mineral
exploration and production in the real world frequently have dual
allegiances-to the host country, which oversees resource development
on its territory, and to the country of their incorporation and business
headquarters. This means such multinational, vertically integrated
enterprises make key business decisions in response to the tax incentives
(or disincentives) provided by both nations. If the tax returns of the
integrated enterprise are consolidated in the home country, then the home
country's tax policies regarding resource exploration and extraction
abroad will have a pronounced influence on the tax regime chosen by the
country seeking to develop resource production through foreign firms.
Most influential of all is the corporate tax system of the United States,
which gives full credit for income taxes paid by foreign branches of U.S.
corporations, up to the level of U.S. liability on foreign source income,
but only allows an expense deduction, rather than tax credit for royalties
(either fees or taxes) paid to foreign resource owners or governments. 7
Consequently, foreign states utilizing branches of U.S. resource
developers are given an additional reason to adopt corporate income
rather than royalty schemes, and "to impose [such] income taxes in
5
amounts up to the tax liability due the United States." by such branch. 1
Similarly, taxes paid under a foreign system of ring fencing are not
subject to a U.S. tax credit, which can result in a U.S. based enterprise

54
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GILLIS, supra note 26, at 130-31.
John F. Due, Taxation of Natural Resources in the Developing Countries, in READINGS ON
TAXATION INDEVELOPING COUNTRIES 186, 198 (Richard M. Bird & Oliver Oldman, eds., 3d ed.
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being taxed twice on the same income-a disincentive to exploration. 5 9
While gauging tax levies to meet complementary foreign tax credits may
constitute a serendipitous form of tax exporting, the risk for tax planners
is that such foreign credits cannot be counted on into the future.
Reliance on them as an element of tax policy introduces a component of
uncertainty in estimating the profitability of future resource production.
Non-Revenue Incentives to Accelerate Development. Another major
source of distortion in the exhaustible resource policies of developing
nations lies in the dilemma such governments face in choosing between
an optimal resource exploration and extraction program with stable, high
yield government revenues over a considerable time, and rapid
development along broad social fronts and under strong internal and
external political impetuses, even when resource revenue models might
caution in favor of slower resource exploitation. By increasing tax
incentives such as immediate deductibility of exploration and drilling
costs or depletion allowances, a government may spur exploration to an
excessive level, and in doing so will sacrifice total realizable revenue.
According to one group of researchers: "The firm has nothing to lose by
additional exploration spending, while the government is sacrificing
revenue. Further exploration expenditures become disadvantageous to
the government far short of
the point at which they become
16
disadvantageous to the firm.' 0
The policies of Malaysia in 1980-85, which involved "making
concessions on production-sharing terms and corporate income taxes in
161
order to stimulate multinational oil exploration and development,"'
appear to be a clear example of a developing nation sacrificing long-term
revenue in order to obtain a quick production payoff and to paper over
62
a worsening short-term balance of payments picture.
Institutional Uncertainties Induced by State Planners. One
common problem is the need to coordinate state agencies to formulate a
coherent national policy with respect to mining--especially the agencies
responsible for tax administration. Thailand's recent experience offers
eloquent testimony of the way a mineral development policy may be
distorted to the point of complete hiatus due to a lack of judicial or quasijudicial sources of finality in decision-making. In Thailand's case,

159 Khan, supra note 51, at 77. For an excellent discussion of U.S. foreign tax credit principles
see Kanel Khan, InternationalTaxation: Taxation of U.S. Petroleum Companies and Foreign
Credits, 6 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 154-61 (1988).
160 Due, supra note 159, at 194.
161 KLAPP, supra note 28, at 124.
162 ld
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"[e]ach government agency has its own 'law' to administer,"'' 63 usually
in the form of internal ministry directives only obliquely alluded to by
statutes, not publicly available to the investor, and not susceptible to
judicial review absent government fraud or misconduct."6 In such an
investment climate, negotiations on minerals exploitation take on a
"shifting sand character."' 65 Meanwhile, government policy makers fail
to grasp the opportunity for investment:
We have seen this in many recent cases of government-initiated
projects ....
[I]n the petroleum or petrochemical fields,
construction costs have increased tremendously as a result of
the Gulf War, thereby effectively rendering certain projects that
were previously regarded as viable uneconomical. The same
holds true for minerals, where fluctuations of world prices,
discoveries of new sources, new substitutions, and new
technologies.., cause the window of opportunity to change.
It is unlikely that the window of opportunity would exist, say,
for six to ten years while... the contract [is] concluded, unless
economic, market, and technological conditions have come...
full circle.'66
VIII. A REVIEW OF AcTuAL MINING SYSTEMS
This Article began by emphasizing how early oil and gas and/or
mining agreements between private sector participants shared the risks
and the rewards of development, and how these paved the way for more
sophisticated arrangements whereby government itself became a
"partner" with the objective of appropriating some of the revenues from
exploitation of nonrenewable resources. Over time, the array of regimes
which impose tax on resource industries throughout the world has
become enormously complex. 67 Tax provisions, and the tax burdens on
companies, are constantly being appraised and fine-tuned. Currently,
world-wide democratization and globalization movements are giving rise

" Jayavadh Bunnag, Thailand'sMineral Resources Crisis-A Legal Practitioner'sViewpoint,
10 J. ENERGY & NAT. REsouRCEs L. 164, 165 (1992).
1i6 Id. at 168.
"65 Id at 169.
166
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67 Minerals and Metals Sector, Natural Resources Canada, Canada's Mining Industry: A

Global Perspective, April 1996, at 73 [hereinafter Global Perspective](noting that "the comparison
of profit-based taxes and royalties among competing jurisdictions is very complex, given the diverse
nature of tax regimes.").
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to a degree of competition among taxation jurisdictions in the world that
probably has never been witnessed before. Governments are under
pressure not to be "out of line" in imposing tax burdens on cbmpanies
exploiting mineral resources, the more so since the mineral industry may
be one of the few engines of growth for economic development.
A diverse array of tax schemes are imposed world-wide. In the area
of nonprofit-based taxes, such as capital, sales, fuel, payroll and
employment-related, property, water, and others, 6 ' there is a strong
element of fixed cost from the point of view of the company. These
taxes show some similarity with private or government royalties, where
payments have to be made irrespective of the profit level or ability of a
company to pay tax in the particular taxation year in question.' 69 The
group of taxes classified as taxes on income are constructed with the
objective that payments to governments will be higher in years in which
the company has a greater ability to pay, and vice versa. This simply
puts government in the position of sharing in the net profit fortunes of
the company. There has been a trend in recent years, particularly
because of the intense competition among jurisdictions to attract mineral
investment, for even government royalties and mining taxes to take on
the form of taxes on net income. 7 °
In the realm of income-based taxes, a plethora of tax rates,
incentives, special write-offs, and other provisions exist.' 7' It is no
wonder that companies, governments and tax practitioners have
difficulty knowing the "bottom line" in terms of the burden imposed by
a particular tax system on a company exploiting a mineral resource in a
particular jurisdiction. A series of studies carried out in Canada have
attempted to provide a snapshot of the actual tax burden imposed by
competing tax jurisdictions;' 7 2 the analysis is restricted to profit-based
taxes and does not purport to cover the "total tax burden."' 73

'6
6
170

Id. at 77.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
See Government/Industry Task Force on Investment Climate, Intergovernmental Working

Group on the Mineral Industry, FinalReport on Mineral Taxation Concerns, September 1993, at
vii-viii [hereinafter Final Report] (noting that "[slince the late 1980's, there have been numerous
changes to tax rules in the world's major mineral producing countries").
... Id. ("[in attempting to document and analyze the world's various tax regimes applicable
to mining, the Task Force undertook a daunting task to say the least.").
" The majority of citations in this section refer to these Canadian studies, which were carried
out by various branches of Natural Resources Canada. Dr. Keith Brewer is the Director-General of
the Economic and Financial Analysis Branch, Mineral and Metals Sector, Natural Resources Canada,
and participated in and/or authored many of the studies/final reports.
1
The total tax burden imposed by a given jurisdiction is measured by the proportion of profit
taken as tax from the company by the taxing jurisdiction. Global Perspective,supra note 168, at 77.
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Nevertheless, the reader may be surprised by some of the key findings
that appear on detailed examination of the world mineral tax system.
First, the range of statutory income tax rates' is wide, from well
over 50% in some jurisdictions to as low as 15% in others (where
75
earnings can be repatriated out of the country, however).
Nevertheless, the actual tax burden' 76 imposed on an individual firm is
not spread so widely. The "competitive range" of tax burden is, for the
most part, is in the 30 to 40% range. 77 Some jurisdictions impose tax
burdens above 40%, and there are also some below 30%.178 The reason
for this narrower range is that jurisdictions with high statutory tax rates
tend also to allow tax deductions and/or incentives or other write-offs,
which mitigate the high statutory rates somewhat. A case in point is
Canada, which has high statutory rates but where provisions such as the
resource allowance, fast write-offs for exploration and development and
an accelerated capital cost allowance mean that taxable income can be
zero for perhaps six or more years after a mine starts up) 7 9 Percentage
depletion in the United States is another example of a write-off that is
very useful to companies in reducing the overall tax burden. 8 '
Second, the burden of income-based taxes on a company is the result
of multiplying the statutory tax rate by the "tax base." It is by modifying
the tax base that governments often exert influence on the annual tax
actually payable. Therefore, the tax base can be critical for a firm
considering investing in mineral exploration in a given jurisdiction.
Third, in practice most income tax based systems in the world sit
somewhere between two opposing types of structures: One set spreads
depreciation charges and other write-offs over the life of the project, and
therefore requires tax payments at a relatively low tax rate as soon as
commercial production starts. The other type allows fast write-offs and
other front-loaded investment incentives, thereby allowing for a
relatively long initial tax-free period. After the "tax-free" period is over,

174 Id. at 74 ("Statutory tax rates are the actual tax rates embedded in the tax Acts of the
various jurisdictions.")
175 Government/Industry Task Force on the Canadian Mineral Investment Climate,

Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry: InternationalTax Reference Chartsfor
the Mining Industry, September 1993, Table 2.1 [hereinafter InternationalCharts](noting that while
Chile's statutory tax rate is 15%, Papua New Guinea's is upwards of 50%).
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
17
171 See, e.g., Global Perspective, supra note 168, at 84 (documenting average effective tax
rates on base-metal operations); see also FinalReport,supra note 171, at 11.
'7'
Global Perspective,supra note 168, at 84.
"79 InternationalCharts,supra note 176, at Table 2.1.
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a relatively high statutory tax rate then applies.'
How these different tax regimes render an exact calculation of tax
payable depends on the economic situation itself. The mining industry
is notoriously cyclical, with price fluctuations being rather large over the
economic cycle."'2 Thus, the existence or absence of loss carry-forwards
is important in determining whether any tax deduction write-offs can be
utilized by a company. Very important as well is the actual level of
profitability of the prospective operation.' 83 For instance, if a mine is
extremely profitable, it is usually found that the existence of up-front
deduction and write-offs (available in some tax systems) are of relatively
little value to a firm. ' In such a case, it is more the statutory percentage
rate of tax that determines the proportion of a company's before-tax
profits that are appropriated by government through net income-type
taxes. On the other hand, it has been found that, if the realized rate of
profit of a company is down around 10% per annum, then (in such a
"low profit" case),the existence of up-front deductions present in some
tax systems becomes the principal determinant of both the time profile
of tax payments and also the overall tax burden.' 85
What do these different tax structures mean for companies? Tax
regimes that combine a relatively high statutory tax rate with generous
front-loaded incentives can temper the risk to a company in the early
years of mine life, by the provision of a tax-free period. Such tax
regimes place a relatively light burden on marginal operations (and thus
reduce the chances of early closure), but place a relatively heavy burden
on more profitable operations, which reduces the attractiveness of new
investment. In contrast, tax regimes featuring a low tax rate but no
special up-front incentives leave a higher proportion of the downside
risk, as well as of the potential reward, in the hands of the project owner.
Which regime is better depends on many factors, including whether it is
viewed from the point of view of the company or the government,
whether the mineral development turns out to be profitable or marginal
(something not easily foreseen), and whether one wishes to hedge one's
bets against an unpredictable future.
As to the future, one thing is certain: change. Many developing
nations in Latin America, Africa and the Asia-Pacific regions are

...See Global Perspective, supra note 168, at 73.
..
2 See Keith Brewer, et al., Fiscal Systems, RESOuRCES POL'Y 131, 143-45 (June, 1989)
[hereinafter Fiscal Systems].
"
IId. at 139-41.
See id. (discussing the sensitivity of effective tax rates to changes in project profitability).
SId.
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aggressively introducing new incentive measures. 6 Somewhat
paradoxically, some countries have introduced capital taxes as a way to
ensure a level of tax revenue." 7 The future direction will surely be
guided by notions of government revenue stability and the need to keep
companies competitive-and these opposing forces will be heavily
influenced by world economic conditions of demand and price.
CONCLUSIONS

One can glean at least a few basic principles from this review. First,
to the extent that resource economists rely on models which assume
finite resources, the economic consequences of imposing particular
forms of taxation on the production process considered in isolation
appear capable of identification, even of rough estimation, and are
therefore-paradoxically-ultimately of limited interest even to
sovereign states. A state whose resources are finite, or convincingly
estimated as finite, will have little use for the long-term strategic resource
planning that justifies remolding its taxes on production. The interest,
and consequently the need for further economic study, lies in the effects
of taxation and tax subsidization on exploration-the essential activity
that precedes production and continually replenishes it.
Second, from any exploration program, a sovereign state seeks both
verification of possible extraction sites and an accurate idea of the real
extent of its reserves. 88 Apart from underwriting costs of exploration
directly or through tax subsidy, the sovereign owner has no inducement
to offer the exploration developer but the potential for a return on future
production from the anticipated reserve. The dilemma for the sovereign
owner is that the attractiveness of that inducement will be continually
reappraised by the operator, based on the very findings the sovereign
state has commissioned-a process that lasts so long as further
exploration is expected to yield profitable results. The necessity of
providing an economic incentive even to exploratory developers whose
findings are negative (as to either discovery or potential production)
suggests that natural resource taxation rates for existing production must
always be set at something less than full recovery of known economic
rent if an exploratory program is expected to continue indefinitely.

"
Government/Industry Task Force on the Canadian Mineral Investment Climate,
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry, Background Study on Mineral Taxation
Concerns: Incentive Regimes for Mineral Exploration, September 1993, at 21-25.
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Third, the effective measurement of the economic rent which can be
allocated by state authorities in connection with exhaustible resource
extraction, without consequent economic distortion of the extraction
process, depends on the choice of a time profile for exploration and
development commonly agreed upon by entrepreneurs and state
planners.'8 9 Any shift thereafter in the time profile (such as that
occasioned by a change in the existing tax structure) implies a new set
of marginal incentives in computing risk-bearing returns of any
venture. 190
Fourth, in the ongoing encounters between prospective mineral
producers and a sovereign state, the inevitable topic will be venture risk.
Private developers with proven entrepreneurial records are typically good
at risk assessment, and poor at risk absorption. Sovereign states are poor
at risk assessment and reasonably adept at risk absorption. The beauty
of the fragmenting of mineral interests under the American common law
mineral leasing system may lie not merely in the reallocation of
prospective profit and potential risk among numerous economic interests,
but in the collective benefits the entire enterprise receives from the
highly individuated risk assessment analysis each actor undertakes from
the standpoint of his own economic self-interest. To the attentive state
policy maker, this market analysis is available free of cost, and may
prove highly reliable, so long as the state's own subsidies and tax
incentives are not part of any individual entrepreneur's objective venture
risk equation.
Fifth, while states that are dependent on venture risk analysis can
benefit by carrying out individual risk assessments on the impersonally
motivated evaluations of monopoly producers or subsidized state actors,
there are certain aspects of resource development in which the concerns
of even a fully enlightened state can never approximate the motives of
individual venturers. Among the essential differences are these:
Sovereign's lack ofpolitical isolation. "[T]he government, unlike
the private lessor, can vary the contractual relationship" with private
developers, in response to "changing social and economic conditions."''
Even where the sovereign refrains from the exercise of such power, the
perception of that possibility existence alone may cause resource
producers to evaluate investment prospects differently than they would
in the private marketplace.
Sovereign's potentialfor re-evaluating its bargains in light of its
Wahby, supra note 45, at 113.
See ROWLAND & HANN, supra note 25, at 71.
'9' Vass, supra note 4, at 29.
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a
vulnerability to constituent opinion. A state "is a trustee in1' 92
to... many groups,
macroeconomic context" with "responsibilities ...
to whom the state's political leadership may be ultimately accountable.
No invisible hand ensures that even economically prudent policies will
be popular in the short term. Thus, a government's political self interest
in survival may distort the country's economic self-interest.
There has been a lot of wrestling over the years in the field of
economics over the problem of how to analyze situations in a
manageable way when we know that all of the exogenous factors change
every day. In concept, economists usually start off by using a steadystate equilibrium model. This has the advantage that one can talk about
assumptions, and then one only has to change one or two exogenous
variables at a time to talk about their impact. In real life of course, many
factors are often changing simultaneously, and this upsets the ability to
state with any degree of certainty what are truisms. In the economics
field, the criticisms that have been leveled against neo-classical
economics, as it is taught at the elementary level, are really of this sort.
This sort of observation is helpful as a warning not to trust simple
models in a real life situation, but the authors also feel there is no way
around having to apply oneself to the discipline of the simple models
surveyed in this Article.
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

As stated earlier, the core difficulty for government planners is to
select a fiscal and regulatory regime that will collect the full measure of
rent in light of all the real world factors. Numerous factors bedevil that
process, including limited worldwide mining budgets, misinformation
about political risk, and so forth. We believe that the advice falls into
several categories.
First, information is paramount: geological data and information
about the legal, administrative systems, and political systems should be
freely available at minimum cost (whatever that term may mean
precisely).
Second, empirical studies are needed; governments should
systematically collect data on the impact of its tax system on the natural
resources sector. Governments cannot rely on companies' bold
declarations because companies have an incentive to minimize taxes. In
addition, countries should share empirical data on taxation as well as be
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aware of each others' taxes. Universities and specialized institutes
should be encouraged to train geologists and other to gain a full
understanding of how operators and landowners-whether or not
governmental-can logically share the risks and rewards of natural
resource projects. A case method approach to teaching this topic could
be especially powerful.

